Operation Wrath Of God: The Secret History Of European Intelligence And Mossad’s Assassination Campaign

Drew Thompson
Jan 26, 2026

I

I was genuinely surprised and frankly shocked by the announcement on Saturday that Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia is under investigation and presumably detained. I should not have been surprised. Hundreds of senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers have been investigated, detained and imprisoned since Xi came to power in 2012.

Corruption is endemic in the PLA giving Xi Jinping a perpetual and universal anti-corruption tool to purge politically suspect officers from the ranks. I have been hearing rumors since 2023 that he was being investigated, but I always assumed and even hoped that he would escape Xi’s endless purges. For five years Zhang was in charge of the PLA’s procurement enterprise which involves large budgets and presumably large kickbacks. PLA officers reportedly pay superiors for promotions with variable pricing depending on the rank and potential profitability of the position. Zhang’s predecessor and successor were both punished for corruption.

I assessed that Zhang Youxia’s combat experience, his self-confidence, intellect and life-long commitment to the defense of China and the Communist Party would protect him. I thought that his life-long relationship with Xi Jinping would be his insurance. Even their fathers were friends. I thought that some financial impropriety would be overlooked because of his abilities and relationship with Xi.

Mostly, I was rooting for him to survive the purges because I liked him.

General Zhang Youxia spent a week in the United States in May 2012 as part of a delegation led by Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie, hosted by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Zhang was Shenyang Military Region Commander at the time, one of over ten general officers on the delegation with Defense Minister Liang. In 2012, I was the Director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for planning and organizing the delegation’s visit to the United States. I accompanied them on the trip including meetings in the Pentagon and tours of military bases on the East and West coasts.

I got to know Zhang Youxia on that trip, and I liked him.

Some legends in this picture – Dave Stilwell, then Defense Attaché in Beijing (who went on to become Assistant Secretary of State after retiring from the Air Force); Peter Lavoy, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Jim Miller, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; Secretary Panetta and the late Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. I can not remember the name of the US-side’s translator in that meeting. General Zhang Youxia is sitting to Defense Minister Liang’s right out of the camera’s view. At General Liang’s left is one of the PLA’s most capable staff officers and English translators, then-Major Xie Kangmin. I was in the back or out in the hall. The sharp eyed observer will note that DepSec Carter brought a folder with a classification coversheet into the meeting. Don’t ask me why.

Zhang Youxia was different than most other PLA generals I encountered. The PLA is a political organization – it is the armed wing of the Communist Party – it is not a national army sworn to protect the constitution or the country. Officers’ careers are primarily determined by their political reliability and interpersonal relationships. Loyalty and ideology is more important than warfighting ability. Critical thinking and independent thought can be a liability, rather than an asset in the PLA. This is the PLA’s culture. Class struggle was the defining feature of Mao’s society and army so officers came from worker-peasant families, had little education and many were illiterate. That legacy has vestiges today. I encountered many senior PLA officers who were not well educated. They could be intelligent, but you could tell by their strong accents, vocabulary and discussions they were neither intellectual nor worldly. Some senior officers were very good at spouting the Party line by memory at length but could say little else.

Zhang Youxia stood out. Had seen combat and been humbled by it. He is educated, intellectual, intuitive. He would see something on display and understood its importance and value, and probably also understood why we were showing it to him.

I worked closely for years with my counterparts, the younger PLA staff officers responsible for US-engagement. We bonded over many, many meetings at all hours in Washington and Beijing, including travelling delegations like the one Zhang Youxia joined. There was healthy mutual respect between the China Desk in the Pentagon and the America’s Desk in the PLA HQ. My counterparts staffing the PLA delegations of course had their own relationships with their generals. It was always fascinating to me how they responded to and supported their own senior leaders. Some PLA generals needed hand-holding, spoon-feeding, lots of ego stroking, and those normally had little substance to offer in discussions. Their staff officers served them, but I could see they had less respect for those generals. I always guessed those officers paid for their positions and had proven the Peter Principle.

Zhang Youxia was different. He had an aura of competence around him. The other PLA generals and staff officers could see it, and they respected him for it. They stood up faster and straighter when he entered a room. They gave him their best. It wasn’t just that he was one of the few remaining officers to have fought (and lost) the brief war with Vietnam in 1979, or that he went to kindergarten with Xi Jinping, but he had that going for him too.

Zhang Youxia talked with me that week more than any other PLA general on a delegation. He was inquisitive, thoughtful, respectful. He had high empathy. He wasn’t afraid to talk to foreigners unlike some other senior officers who were often afraid or unable to engage. (Maybe my Chinese was too terrible for them to listen to). He treated his own staff officers with respect, and I suppose he was treating me the same way. I was impressed that he would engage me in conversation because it was unusual.

When we visited Fort Benning, Zhang became animated. We offered the opportunity for him to see static displays of some weapon systems, and the opportunity to fire a few. Many PLA officers are essentially focused on administrative and political roles, not warfighting. Many have never fired a gun and would hesitate before engaging non-commissioned officers on a firing range. Not Zhang. He jumped at the chance to fire a machine gun. He focused on all the static displays and asked the briefers good questions about US technology and doctrine (don’t worry, everything was unclassified!) Many generals don’t know what questions to ask a briefer because their staff didn’t give them questions in advance. Seeing Zhang Youxia tour a military base and absorb what he was offered revealed an intellect that stood out from his peers.

General Zhang leaped at the chance to test fire an M240 machine gun. (I went straight for the .50 cal!)

He thoroughly enjoyed the “weapons orientation” experience. These are my personal photos taken at Fort Benning, GA. I gave copies to him.

My hope – for the sake of stable US-China military-to-military relations and cross-Strait stability - was that Zhang Youxia would stay at the top of the CMC and remain Xi Jinping’s closest military advisor. I think he was the one active duty PLA officer who could give Xi the best, most objective advice about PLA military capabilities including the PLA’s shortcomings, and crucially the human cost of military conflict. I think he could assess US and Taiwan military capabilities objectively and explain to Xi Jinping what the military risks and costs of an operation to take Taiwan would be. A sycophant with no combat experience has to tell Xi what Xi wants to hear. Zhang’s intellect, experience and his relationship with Xi made honesty and objectivity possible, and that makes him an exception among PLA generals.

Zhang Youxia is on the edge of the photo, eyeballing the system on display, while General Liang looks at the briefer. I was exhausted after a week of travel and meetings which explains my bloodshot eyes and the bags under them. I was also a bit angry in this photo because a PLA attaché travelling with us had just done something naughty but inconsequential, so I was using my deterrence face so he wouldn’t do it again. You have to set boundaries.

For a US deterrence strategy to be effective we need Xi Jinping to be surrounded by competent generals who will give him objective advice. The sole remaining general on the CMC is Zhang Shengmin, a career political commissar. Leaving aside the governance and operational risks of Xi being advised by and trying to command a million-man army through a one-man committee, I worry about the consequences of someone other than Zhang Youxia providing Xi Jinping with military advice.

Without Zhang Youxia on the CMC, the risk of miscalculation goes up.

Having worked on US-China relations in some way most of my adult life, that makes the potential consequences of an investigation and likely detention of Zhang Youxia a personal disappointment.

There is another layer to my personal feelings about Zhang Youxia’s demise.

In October 2023, South China Morning Post reporter Minnie Chan was visiting Beijing for the Xiangshan Forum when she disappeared. She was researching rumors that Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin were being investigated at the time.

It is no secret that she and I were in regular contact. I was quoted in many of her articles about the PLA, providing my analytical assessment of whatever issue or fact she was researching and reporting on. She was a friend too. She knew the PLA as well as any outsider and we could compare notes all day. I usually learned more from her than she from me. We would sometimes speak on the phone, and sometimes text. Soon after she disappeared, all but one of her texts to me were deleted. I don’t know if she deleted them or if it was whoever is holding her and took control of her phone.

A month before her disappearance we were discussing whether or not Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin were being investigated. She was certain. In September 2023 when I asked, “Do you think Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin are in trouble and being investigated?” She responded succinctly, “Yes”.

That one word text is the only one in the string that was not deleted.

I don’t know why Minnie was detained and is still in custody. She had many Mainland sources and contacts and worked on many stories, so I have no idea if her investigation into investigations of Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin in 2023 was the cause of her being disappeared.

My hope is now that the investigation of Zhang Youxia is public, Minnie can be released and can go back to producing excellent articles that provided accurate, authentic perspectives of China’s military and defense strategy so we can better understand China and reduce the risk of misperception.

I fear she has been forgotten.

I want my friends back.

Zhang Youxia inspecting an MRAP at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, May 2012. I am flanked by three PLA officers I greatly respect. L to R: Rear Admiral Li Ji, deputy director of the PLA’s foreign affairs office; Maj Gen Xu Nanfeng, Defense Attaché in Washington, and then Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, director for the Americas in the foreign affairs office.

Canada needs to bolster its national security apparatus. That’s not a compelling reason to launch a new agency, which would be a disruptive, time consuming, and costly machinery change.

By Martin Green, January 26, 2026

A cacophony of national security trends and threats are rightly a central part of Canada’s current public discourse.

There is a refreshing consensus on the imperative of Canada’s defence and national security missions, and therein having the strong “intelligence” collection and analysis capabilities that our leaders—and Canadians—must have to be strategically competitive, secure, and resilient.

As a military brat, and during my time as a senior national security and intelligence official, I often wondered why Canada didn’t have a dedicated human foreign-spy agency. Putting aside the fanciful notions of a Canadian 007 or Mission Impossible, the short answer is that we are a part of the 21st-century “great game.” But we need to better use our existing capabilities and authorities domestically and internationally.

As Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government articulates a new and welcomed vision for defence and national security, a decades-old discussion of this country having its own Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Secret Service (MI6) type spy organization has been percolating.

The renewed impetus for this appears to be that the United States under President Donald Trump is no longer a reliable partner—partly true. And, that Canada needs to focus on and bolster its national security apparatus in the face of growing nefarious trends and threats—true. I don’t think, however, that these are compelling reasons for Canada to embark on such a disruptive, time consuming, and costly machinery change. Urgency dictates that we prioritize, consolidate, and build on what we have.

Trump’s first presidency raised a lot of eyebrows in the world’s intelligence communities. His contempt for his own intelligence community and attempts to politicize them were at best counter-intuitive and unsettling. The U.S. spy community—who are, by and large, dedicated and professional—was stirred (not shaken) by this development, and they remained relatively unscathed with trusted foreign partnerships intact.

Trump 2.0, fuelled by a four-year break and a belligerent National Security Strategy, has politicized and weaponized almost every aspect of the American government. Leadership across the U.S. intelligence community has been decapitated and replaced with an almost tragicomical array of lap dogs.

This is unquestionably disturbing for the G7, Five Eyes, NATO members, and other partners. It is particularly so for Canada, as we have been a net beneficiary of our unique and historic integration with the behemoth American national security, intelligence, and military apparatus. As troubled, divisive, and deplorable as the Trump administration appears to most Canadians (and, I believe, the majority of Americans) it is inconceivable that either country would or should attempt to fully decouple or bifurcate from these partnerships. There is simply too much at stake and in our common interests.

While Canada should always be diversifying economically and bolstering our sovereign national security capabilities, it is unrealistic and foolhardy to think the two countries can fully disengage. While our relationship with the U.S. has permanently changed and remains fraught, out of pragmatic necessity a “quantum of solace” will eventually be restored.

As a lagging middle power, Canada needs to take a realistic review of our place in the world and articulate a national security strategy. We also need to ask ourselves some hard questions before embracing a new human foreign spy agency.

What are we fixing? What are the gaps we are trying to fill? Who and what are we targeting? Do we envisage ourselves having a paramilitary organization like the CIA or MI6? What would the return on investment actually be? Have we fully utilized open-source intelligence with our covert capabilities and authorities? Are all levels of government, the private sector, and the Canadian public well enough informed on national security trends and threats? The answer to all of these questions is: no, not really.

Canada already has significant networks and assets (both public and private) at home and abroad. We also know that the home game is paramount. We have the essential ingredients in our national security ecosystem for enhanced foreign intelligence collection and analysis. This is where we need to start. What is required are the leaders, the clear direction, and the support for calculated risks that will enable our national security practitioners to succeed.

We are clearly in a time of multiple crises and we are at a crossroads. We need to keep our eye on the ball. The priorities are rebuilding our defence mission and bolstering our economic security. So, when it comes to a bricks and mortar foreign spy agency, never say never, but now is certainly not the time.

Martin Green is a senior adviser at Global Public Policy in Ottawa, and is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He is a former assistant secretary to cabinet, intelligence assessment at the Privy Council Office.

Years ago, I purchased the first-generation Roborock robot vacuum from Chinese company Xiaomi. Almost immediately, I noticed it was sending an extraordinary amount of encrypted data back to China. The official explanation: "Floor map models" and other "support features."

At the time, I was working in the intelligence community. When I raised my concerns, I was met with a familiar response: "You're just being paranoid."

Fast forward to 2026, and the "paranoia" is looking more like foresight. Modern Chinese robot vacuums have evolved into persistent surveillance devices, continuously uploading high-resolution floor maps, Wi-Fi credentials, and GPS locations to mainland PRC servers. LiDAR sensors can be hijacked as acoustic eavesdropping tools, reconstructing conversations with 91% accuracy, while documented camera vulnerabilities allow for live video feeds without user consent.

Despite this, it might surprise you to know that I still use my Roborock after two battery replacements. It remains the best robot vacuum I have ever owned. You might ask why I would keep such a device in my home.

The reality is that I'm not a collection priority for the PRC state. If I am, excellent; they are simply wasting their resources listening to Real Housewives reruns and watching me walk around my house with no pants. Beyond that, because almost everything is made in China, we often have very little choice in the matter. As we face even greater threats, such as PRC-made electric vehicles entering our marketplace, the goal is not necessarily total avoidance, but rather understanding the risks and mitigating them.

I still let my robot clean, but I've revoked its "clearance." I don't allow it any internet or network access, sacrificing a few smart features for peace of mind.

Pillar Member - Ryan Zorn

President CyberAGroup

For more tech / security stories head over to :  www.cyberagroup.com

Pillar member and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network - Neil Bisson - sits down with Marc La Ferrière, a retired CSIS intelligence officer, Pillar Society member, and author of the novel Escalating Fury.

Marc reflects on his atypical 30-plus-year career with CSIS, which spanned the pre-9/11 era through to modern intelligence operations. He discusses what first sparked his interest in intelligence work, his time in regional roles in Vancouver, his experience in training and internal security, and how he moved back and forth between operational and non-operational positions over the course of his career.

The conversation then turns to what led Marc to start writing. He explains the catalyst behind his first book, an autobiography, and how that project eventually pushed him into fiction. Marc opens up about the realities of being a self-published author, including the challenges, discipline, and creative demands of the process.

Neil and Marc dive into his novel Escalating Fury, where Marc shares what inspired the story, how his intelligence background shaped the narrative, and how he developed the book’s main character, Zak Power. Marc also walks listeners through his writing technique, how he structures his work, and when readers can expect the next installment in the series.

As a bilingual Canadian author, Marc also discusses the advantages and challenges of writing in both official languages, and how working in both French and English has shaped his creative approach.

This episode offers a rare behind-the-scenes look at the transition from intelligence officer to novelist — and how real-world intelligence experience informs fictional storytelling.

Check it out on Buzzsprout: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/episodes/18578453

or

Youtube: https://youtu.be/flvpycbKlvY

Connect with Marc & Get His Books

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/marc.lafury
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/marclafury/
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/marc-la-ferri%C3%A8re-943634205/

Marc is frequently out and about in the Ottawa–Gatineau region and is often happy to meet in person — which means you may be able to purchase a copy of his books directly from him and get a personally signed copy.

Where to get Marc’s books:

Escalating Fury (ebook):https://librairielouisfrechette.ca/fr/Produit-24965-Escalating-Fury-Neuf-Format-Regulier

All available titles:
https://www.booksellers.ca/catalogue?s=Marc%20La%20Ferrière&sort=pertinence

This Public opinion research report presents the results of an online/telephone survey of 2,045
Canadians between January 9 and 22, 2025.

Cette publication est aussi disponible en français sous le titre : Attitudes du public à l’égard du
Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS)

https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.949166/publication.html

At the beginning of Donald Trump's second administration, one of his most important goals announced during his 2024 campaign was his plan to expand the influence of the United States by annexing strategic and or mineral rich countries such as Panama, Greenland and or Canada – notwithstanding that the latter two countries belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  

Historically such rhetorical threats from our largest trading partner and benign ally, is not a “new thing”.

The underpinnings of our relations with the USA, is not a marriage but like some marriages, is for the most part, predicated on mutual security requirements and economic prosperity.  Deeply entrenched in the United States national security psyche lives an ideology that over the years has promoted the acquisition of and or the annexation of neighbouring countries and territories - as a strategy by which to control the political narrative of the Western Hemisphere thereby solidifying its position in the future “world order”.

Manifest Destiny:  The term manifest destiny was coined by newspaper editor John O’Sullivan in 1845 who used the term to justify the USA’s territorial expansion across North America asserting that it was a God given right to spread democracy and American ideals from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  

In 1783, following the Treaty of Paris, the United States was composed of 13 former colonies stretching from Canada (British colony) in the north to Florida (Spanish colony) in the south and to the Mississippi River in the west.   Over the next 115 years, the United States acquired twenty-nine (29) large and small territories.  Today, the USA is composed of fifty (50) states and 14 territories. The following is a short list of the more significant acquisitions / annexations.

• 1)      Louisiana Purchase 1803 – purchased from France for $15 million. According to President Jefferson the major reason for the purchase was “national security” – the US would gain control over the Mississippi River. (a common refrain even today).  
• 2)      Florida 1819 – acquired from Spain via the Adams – Onis Treaty.
• 3)      Texas Annexation 1845 – annexed as an independent republic.
• 4)      Oregon Territory 1846 – treaty with Great Britain securing the Pacific Northwest.
• 5)      Mexican Cessation 1848 – gained from Mexico (what is now California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming). 
• 6)      Gadsden Purchase 1853 – purchased from Mexico (what is now southern Arizona and southern New Mexico).
• 7)      Alaska 1867 - purchased from Russia for 7.2 million dollars.
• 8)      Hawaii 1898 – annexed after overthrowing the Hawaiian dynasty.
• 9)      Pacific and Caribbean Territories 1856 – Guano Islands.
• 10)  Puerto Rico, Guam, Philippines 1898 - acquired from Spain after the Spanish American War.        

 War of 1812:  Canada’s first taste of imperial expansionism occurred in the early 1800’s - a biproduct of a greater conflict in Europe between Great Britain and Napoleonic France which would ultimately determine dominance over Europe.  Post 1783 (American Independence) Great Britain remained dominant over the world’s oceans and the British Royal Navy’s encroachment on American maritime rights had a serious impact on American trade and commerce.  With Great Britain tied up in a war with France, President Madison decided to seize the opportunity and declare war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812.  Hoping to get a quick win in their fight with Great Britain, America decided to invade Canada and use its conquest as a bargaining chip to win concessions from Great Britain especially as it relates to maritime issues.  At the time, the population of Canada was approximately 500,000 compared to 7.7 million people in America.  Former President Thomas Jefferson assumed the conquest of Canada would be “a mere matter of marching”.  Most Americans believed that they would be welcomed as liberators from British rule.

In 1812 American armies invaded Canada at three points and all three attempts ended in failure.  A similar prolonged invasion occurred in 1813 with America achieving some success in the West (Lake Erie). 

In 1814, the United States armies found themselves on the defensive following Napoleon’s defeat.  Great Britain quickly shifted attention to its protracted conflict with America.  The Royal Navy started transporting battle hardened troops to Canada while at the same time increasing its blockade of American ports.  Battles were won and lost on the great lakes and at key forts along a joint frontier. 

With the cost of the war wearing thin on Great Britain and the American economy teetering on ruin both sides eventually agreed to a cessation of the conflict.  On December 24, 1814 Great Britain entered into a treaty with America.  On February 17, 1815 both sides ratified the treaty (Treaty of Ghent) with the provision (quo ante bellum) that all conquered territory must be returned as it existed before the conflict.

A costly skirmish for both sides.  America suffered 15,000 casualties and Great Britain suffered 8,600 casualties (British Regulars and Canadian militia).  An unknown number of indigenous people also perished in the conflict as warriors or the result of starvation and disease.

Not prepared to repeat the War of 1812 with Great Britian, the United States started to search for a national strategy to deal with incursions from their imperial neighbours…     

The Monroe Doctrine:  President Monroe, a close ally of President Madison, was president for two terms from 1817 to 1825.  James Monroe and two other statesmen were Secretaries of State and War during the War of 1812.   James Monroe, more specifically, was Secretary of State and War between 1814 and 1815.

A veteran of the War of 1812, Monroe was no stranger to European hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  The Monroe Doctrine was enacted on December 2, 1823 in an annual message to Congress warning European powers (especially Great Britain, France and Spain) against further colonization or interference in the Western Hemisphere. 

According to Monroe, “European powers are obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ sphere of interest.”  (The Westen Hemisphere comprises half the earths surface including a sizeable chunk of the North Pole and Antarctica).

The Monroe Doctrine originated as a “statement of intent” not a formal law supported by the US Congress.  Its implementation is arbitrary and has historically been the responsibility of the President visa vis the conduct of foreign affairs.  The Monroe Doctrine has no standing in international law.  (Smaller indefensible countries within the Western Hemisphere have little or no recourse if invaded by the USA).

For example, the Monroe Doctrine was first invoked in 1865 when the U.S, government exerted diplomatic and military pressure in support of the Mexican President Benito Juarez.  This support enabled Juarez to lead a successful revolt against the Emperor Maximilian, who had been placed on the throne by the French President Napoleon.  

Again in 1940 European creditors from a number of Latin American countries threatened armed intervention to collect debts. Citing the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt promptly proclaimed the right of the United States to exercise international police powers to curb such chronic wrong doing.

The U.S. also has a long history of interventions in South America - called the Banana Wars 1898 – 1934. Santo Domingo 1904, Nicaragua 1912 and 1933, Dominion Republic 1916 and 1924, Haiti 1915 and 1934, Guatemala 1954, The Bay of Pigs (Cuba) 1961, Chile 1973, Grenada 1983, Panama 1989… and now Venezuela 2026.

Although the Monroe Doctrine was essentially established to keep European powers out of the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt strengthened and expanded its meaning to justify the sending of American troops into any country or territory within the Western Hemisphere.  Invoking the Monroe Doctrine to enable the annexation of a friendly territory or nation for hegemonic purposes is totally contrary to the purpose for which the Monroe Doctrine was created in the first place and is a violation of the principles of “rules based” order.

Comment:    

The threat environment to which we have become accustomed has shifted significantly provoking serious change in the world order. 

Given the emerging threats to our sovereignty, how does our intelligence community navigate its way through these unprecedented times while protecting the nation from both former allies one day and adversaries the next.  (Should we be preparing for a NATO minus the USA).  We need to rethink some of our legacy relationships and retool our intelligence collection strategy to include emerging threats to our sovereignty.  Expediting the formation of a foreign intelligence capability, whether inside or outside the Service, should be a priority and would certainly send a message to trusted partners that we are indeed serious players within the global intelligence community.      

Norm Killian - Pillar Member

Published: Australian Strategic Policy Institute - Chris Taylor

Organization: Australian Security Intelligence Organization

The Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) is reviewing legislation confirming the reality of an extraordinary, rarely used intelligence capability that has been part of national security law for 22 years: the Australian Security Intelligence Organization's compulsory questioning powers. The bill also hones and configures the powers for Australia’s security environment, both current and foreshadowed.

ASIO’s questioning warrants (QWs) require a person to appear before the organization and answer questions truthfully for the purpose of gathering intelligence—including by detaining that person for up to seven days. They also restrict that person’s ability to alert others to ASIO’s interest or destroy relevant material. (Questioning detention warrants, which allowed ASIO to per-emptively detain a person for questioning, were available until 2020.)

The bill currently under review, the ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025, makes three principal changes. First, it makes the powers permanent, though this will be reviewed by the PJCIS in three years. It also expands their scope beyond the grounds of politically motivated violence, espionage and foreign interference to include all seven of ASIO’s areas (‘heads’) of security. As a result, sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia’s defence system, and protection of territorial and border integrity will also be grounds for QWs. Finally, it bolsters associated oversight protections, such as further limiting who can be a prescribed authority overseeing questioning.

These changes raise two key questions: Should the powers be retained permanently? And should the powers apply to all elements of security?

These powers, first instituted in 2003, have often been described publicly as a temporary measure only. However, they have been regularly prolonged—in 2006, then 2014, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Their application has also been expanded, from politically motivated violence alone to include espionage and foreign interference.

The ASIO Amendment Act (no. 1) 2025 again extended the sunsetting date for the powers to March 2027. Otherwise, they would have ceased on 7 September.

The powers are rarely used: according to the public record, ASIO has only requested a compulsory questioning warrant five times since 2006. In 22 years, 20 warrants in total have been sought and issued.

When the powers were introduced, the rationale was that terrorism presented an unprecedented and extraordinary threat to Australia, and that responding required similarly extraordinary powers. The temporary nature of the powers was an acknowledgement of this and ensured passage through the Senate. But as time has passed, it’s become increasingly clear that the adverse security circumstances in question have become the norm as threats facing Australia have broadened and been entrenched.

Importantly, since 2006, the parliament has consistently acted to retain the powers, despite calls for repeal. This demonstrates that, rather than temporary powers, these are de facto permanent powers. Rather than continue to pretend otherwise, their status should be definitively addressed.

That the powers have only been used sparingly does not invalidate them or make them redundant. Rather, they are tools for use in extraordinary circumstances where other means for intelligence collection are inapplicable. This continues to reflect the original argument for the powers, ‘as a measure of last resort’ to be ‘used rarely and only in extreme circumstances’. In addition, authoritative accounts of the use of the powers suggest that ASIO exercises the powers judiciously and sensitively.

The powers will remain subject to a robust warrant regime, even absent a sunset clause. ASIO’s annual reporting regime—mandated by the ASIO Act­—requires their use to be reported publicly. This is in addition to public testimony, for example at Senate estimates.

The nature of the security environment and ongoing developments means the compulsory questioning powers should be applicable to a broad range of security threats.

Application to promotion of communal violence—‘activities that are directed to promoting violence between different groups of persons in the Australian community so as to endanger the peace, order or good government of the Commonwealth’—is apt given ongoing attempts by extremists to fracture social cohesion in Australian society. That this has included covert interference efforts by a hostile foreign actor (Iran) underscores the blurred lines between the heads of security.

But it is two other aspects of security that are particularly appropriate to be included within the potential exercise: attacks on Australia’s defence system, and sabotage.

These two security threats are closely related and increasingly pertinent. As I noted last year following Israeli intelligence’s audacious sabotage of Hezbollah’s communications network, sabotage—destroying, damaging or obstructing for military and/or political advantage—is back. This point is only reinforced by ongoing Russia-backed attacks on military capabilities and stores in Europe.

As Australia’s investment in the AUKUS program grows and as the prospect of major power conflict in our region becomes ever more concerning, the implications of this international resurgence in sabotage as a coercive tool—potentially applied to Australia’s often niche and concentrated defence capabilities—are greatly concerning. ASIO being able to respond with the same suite of intelligence collection capabilities that are available against other security threats, including extraordinary powers used only in extraordinary circumstances, will be vital.

 

This article is based on the author’s submission  to the PJCIS inquiry into ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025.

It has been corrected to say that questioning detention warrants were available until 2020 and to delete a reference to the ASIO Amendment (no. 2) Bill 2025 applying to them.

The Conversation
Published: April 30, 2024

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau tours a quantum technology company in January 2023

The recent release of the Department of National Defence’s policy update, Our North, Strong and Free, outlines the progress being made by the federal government on two major security issues facing Canada: the warming Arctic and cyber warfare.

A major focal point of the policy update is the need to develop cutting-edge, quantum-based defence technology that will help Canada address these two threats.

Quantum technology uses the sensitivity of sub-atomic particles to create increasingly precise measurements of an environment. This provides Canada the ability to better track environmental changes, potential trespassers in sovereign territory and the beginnings of cyberattacks before they become real threats. It’s a game-changer in both physical and cyber domains.

The Arctic and climate change are a major focus of the policy update due to melting polar ice that will make it easier for competitive states to traverse the area and reap economic benefits.

Of particular concern are ships coming from Canada’s top two adversaries, Russia and China. To combat the threat, Canada says it intends to develop improved quantum sensing technology, in which light sources are able to produce more sensitive and accurate sensing of their environment over a period of time.

A Russian icebreaker makes the path for a cargo ship near Nagurskoye, Russia, in May 2021.

Over the next seven years, Canada will mobilize research teams with its allies to fine-tune the technology. It’s currently in the first year of the strategy that calls for continuing research into quantum technology. The ensuing years will focus on the goals of Our North, Strong and Free.

Quantum sensing has been specialized and applied to radar technologies that will be used to chart and monitor Arctic territory. Furthermore, with support from its Five Eyes allies, Canadian information is being made quantum-safe through extensive investment into cryptography.

This means that Canadian intellectual property produced through dozens of national funding projects could be further protected from competitive, hostile entities like China and Russia.

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces unveiled their first major quantum strategy, the Quantum Science and Technology Strategy, in 2021.

The strategy acted as the foundation for Canada’s quantum industry and its goal was to ensure quantum can apply to defence. This was the first time Canada linked quantum technology, climate and the Arctic.

These promising proposals led to the development of an official quantum-focused strategy entitled the National Quantum Strategy in 2023. It has allocated $360 million to address existing gaps in knowledge in quantum development.

Working with academia, private sector

There has been direct collaboration with both academic institutions and private industry on quantum technology. The aim is to invest in a diverse quantum portfolio to protect information, process data through quantum computing and to detect new threats in Canadian and allied territory.

Sensing technology is a significant component of each of these quantum technology strategies.

The technology is vital for future climate change detection and can play a key role in Canada’s pursuit of innovative, new and useful technology that will benefit its scientific leadership among its allies.

The latest defence policy update expresses an aim to improve search-and-rescue procedures in the North, increase Arctic charting and improve monitoring of shared NORAD airspace. The heightened sensitivity of quantum sensors will allow Canada to make these contributions.

A Canadian icebreaker in Allen Bay near Resolute, Nunavut

Cyberattacks

Our North, Strong and Free also called for the development of proper countermeasures against potential cyberattacks. Canada has been pursuing protections against state-sponsored hackers through quantum cryptography.

Quantum-based cyberspace protections prevent incredibly efficient computers from cracking codes by radically slowing their ability to process information.

The policy update’s focus on the cyber domain — which includes any aspect of the digital sector, public or private — is fuelled by the global increase in grey-zone conflicts, actions taken by a state that don’t necessarily warrant a declaration of war.

Usually, this involves a cyberattack, such as the widespread Russian disinformation campaign during the 2016 American election.

Canada has stated in the policy update that it will look not only into quantum computing to combat cyber threats, but also artificial intelligence, machine learning and other technological advances to secure Canadians online. Protecting Canadian information could safeguard Canada from potential grey-zone attacks, like intellectual property theft.

Moving forward

On Canada’s top security priorities — cybersecurity and Arctic safety — the federal government has been moving quietly but purposefully, with support from its allies.

The update also pledged an increase in funding to NORAD and NATO to 1.76 per cent of Canada’s GDP from its previous 1.33 per cent.

While not yet at the two per cent NATO guideline, these increases also suggest Canada is taking its security seriously.

Gangster Lawrence Bishnoi is surrounded by heavy police security as he exits court on Oct. 31, 2022, in Amritsar, India. Canada listed the Bishnoi gang as a terrorist entity in September, 2025.

Published January 2, 2026

A formal review of Canada’s processes for designating terrorist groups is needed, say national security experts, warning that recent decisions to list organized crime groups could distract counterterrorism officials from their core work of preventing mass attacks.

Law experts further warn that any findings of a lack of rigour in Canada’s listing process could potentially expose the entire federal Anti-Terrorism Act to significant court battles.

Created in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Public Safety Canada’s designated list initially included mostly Islamist extremist groups such as al-Qaeda. Over the past five years, federal cabinet ministers responsible for the list have also added several violent white-supremacist groups and nihilistic online entities.

Then, in 2025,Canadian notions of what is legally considered terrorism appeared to change. On Feb. 20, both Canada and the United States designated the same seven drug cartels,predominantly from Mexico, as terrorist entities. U.S. President Donald Trump had just returned to office and was mounting a trade war against Canada, citing unsubstantiated allegations that fentanyl was flowing into his country over its northern border.

In October, Ottawa listed the India-based Bishnoi Gang after regional politicians, including Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown, pressed the federal government to take this step. Mr. Brown said in an interview that he did this hoping such a listing might curb the group’s alleged violent extortion rackets within Canada’s South Asian communities.

The federal government’s power to designate an entity as a terrorist organization under the Criminal Code is a significant measure. In Canada, it gives banks the power to immediately seize a group’s assets. Listings can also encourage law-enforcement, intelligence and border agencies to redirect resources, launch probes or step up scrutiny of suspected members.

Experts say, however, that there has been little public explanation from officials in Ottawa as to precisely why they appear to be altering a national-security power in order to take aim at organized-crime groups.

“I am concerned that it has become what I would call ‘vibes-based policy,’ as opposed to the process that has traditionally existed,” says Carleton University professor Stephanie Carvin, who specializes in national-security issues.

Intelligence watchdogs in Ottawa should scrutinize the federal government’s most recent listings of terrorist groups, Prof. Carvin said. “This does, at the end of the day, still need to be an evidence-based process,” she said. “What those review bodies are good at is pointing out is where there’s a lack of standards.”

Brian Phillips, a former U.S. Marine who teaches security at the University of Essex in England, said that expansions of the legal definition of terrorism can have unpredictable, or even dangerous, consequences.

“If Canada loses its focus on more traditional terrorists, like Islamist terrorists or white supremacists, this could have serious implications for Canada’s national security,” he said.

Prof. Phillips said in an interview that counterterrorism measures are often ineffective against crime gangs. He added that Canada’s cartel-listing measure appears to have been purely intended to ward off the Trump administration’s tariff threats.

Along with Britain, New Zealand and Australia, Canada and the United States are part of what’s known as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – an exceptionally close security partnership forged after the Second World War. However, Canada and the U.S. are the only two countries in this group to have designated Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations.

Government officials in Ottawa say that the new designations of organized-crime groups are justified. “The decision to list an entity under the Criminal Code follows a rigorous, evidence-based process,” said Simon Lafortune, spokesman for Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree.

“Public statements accompanying listings are necessarily limited in detail due to national security and privacy considerations,” he added.

The February decision to list seven drug cartels, including the notorious Sinaloa Cartel, was made under then-prime-minister Justin Trudeau. The public safety minister at the time, David McGuinty, issued a statement alleging these cartels “facilitate terrorist activity by taking hostages, attacking civilian and critical infrastructure, and working to diminish the ability of local governments.”

Mr.Anandasangaree issued a statement in October saying he was designating India’s Bishnoi Gang because it “generates terror through extortion and intimidation.”

One independent watchdog that has the power to review the federal government’s counterterrorism measures is the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA).

“Terrorism listing is not something that we’ve scrutinized thus far,” said Craig Forcese, NSIRA’s vice-chair. In an interview, he said that while his agency has the mandate to look at Public Safety’s designated list, it is struggling with a substantial workload and looming budget cuts.

Michael Nesbitt, a law professor at the University of Calgary, says it is important that politicians adhere to the strictures surrounding the listing process.

One reason for that is because the list is an important thread in the overall fabric of the federal Anti-Terrorism Act, a broader statute passed in 2001 that enables a variety of criminal, border and intelligence actions today.

The listing process “is now very vulnerable to constitutional challenge, which I think should be a huge national security concern,” Prof. Nesbitt said.

He explained that courts would start to ask hard questions if a cartel member ever appeared in a Canadian court to try to reclaim a seized asset or to fight a terrorism charge.

If that happened, the government would be forced to try to prove its anti-terrorism actions are reasonable and constitutional, Prof. Nesbitt said. And if it could not, then “you’re left with a civil-liberties concern that groups are being listed based on political imperatives.”

Security officials in Ottawa say they are assessing the changes to the terrorism list.

“Assets have been seized as a part of investigations into listed entities,” said Marie-Eve Breton, an RCMP spokeswoman. She said federal officials are assessing how the listing of transnational organized crime groups will affect enforcement.

Public Safety Canada spokesman Max Watson said that it is a legal prerequisite that any group that is on the list must be found to have carried out “terrorist activities, as defined by Canada’s Criminal Code.” He said federal Justice Department lawyers independently review listings to ensure they meet this threshold.

Ottawa added 12 new groups to the designated list in 2025, which now comprises 90 entities.