CSIS: same old, same old

Or, let’s try something new

Wesley Wark May 4, 2026

The headline from the recent annual report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was…same old, same old. ^[i]

· On-going foreign interference by the usual bad actors, China, India, Russia. (No mention of the U.S.A, or the potential national security threats posed by the Alberta separatist movement.)

· On-going domestic violent extremism getting more complicated to detect and more ideologically scrambled, even zeroed out. In response, CSIS had to add a new category (alongside religious, ideological and political), “nihilistic violent extremism” (NVE).

· Lots of foreign espionage directed against Canada, especially by Russia and by China. Someone at CSIS has a sense of humour, as they have nicknamed the Chinese intelligence services…wait for it, PRICS.

· Attention continues to be paid by the Service to economic and research security and to the Arctic

The annual report got some one-day coverage in some of the mainstream media (Globe and Mail, Global, National Post) but stirred no editorial attention at the Toronto Star or CBC. No political party jumped on it. No Parliamentary committee promised to study it. There was no statement from the Public Safety Minister or the PM.

That’s life for CSIS—a fitful presence in the public consciousness, the same expansive menu of threats, the same high and unending workload. Fortunately for the Service, they escaped most of the government’s budget reduction scalpel/axe and are only required to cut back by 2%. This, we are told, they can manage without losing workforce, which is their engine.

So, if there are no real surprises in the most recent edition of the CSIS Public Report, maybe we should turn to the question of changes that would allow CSIS not just to slog along, but to be a more effective, high-performance intelligence service operating for a middle power that wants to lead the world. Assuming, of course, that the threat environment is not going to turn sunny any time soon.

To be that leading middle power in a broken international system, Canada needs more foreign intelligence, a lot more. To that end CSIS should be given a clear mandate (which would require a change to some of the oldest and untouched sections of the CSIS Act) to allow it to collect foreign intelligence in accord with the government’s intelligence priorities. This should become job #1 for CSIS.

To free up resources and strategic bandwidth to become a foreign intelligence service, there are onerous functions that CSIS should be set free of. I would include in that list: security screening, immigration screening and national security review of foreign direct investment conducted as part of the Investment Canada Act.

Whoa there, you say. Surely these are all important tasks. Absolutely, but CSIS is drowning in them. Have a look at the stats in the 2025 Public Report.

CSIS received no less than 129,130 security screening requests in 2025.

CSIS ingested 438,000 referrals for security screening of immigration files

CSIS was involved in national security review under the ICA of 1106 investment proposals ^[ii]

The CSIS work on security screening and immigration screening should be turned over to a new, separate agency tasked only with screening and able to apply specialised expertise and data tools, including AI (with a knowledgeable human in the loop). Call it, just to be fancy, Canada’s SAS, “Special Agency for Screening.”

National security review of foreign investment should be part of a new, specialised and stand-alone economic intelligence agency which would work closely with the Department of Finance, Industry Canada, and Global Affairs Canada, but would be the government’s centre of expertise (we don’t have one on economic intelligence at the moment). Surely this idea would appeal to you know who…

While we are at it, axe the ITAC (now reverted to its original 2004 name as Integrated Threat Assessment Centre). Redeploy its analytic assets primarily to Public Safety and, for the relatively recent ITAC mission of detecting threats to politicians, to the RCMP (where it belonged in the first place).

Get CSIS out of cyber security and enforce a no duplication rule with the federal government’s lead on cyber security, which is the Communications Security Establishment.

In this very new-look CSIS hen house, foreign intelligence would rule the roost. That’s the way it should be in future. And yes, we would need to make sure that the RCMP could truly handle the intelligence collection, analysis and law enforcement mission required by domestic threats and violent extremism.

^[i] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report 2025, May 1, 2026, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis-scrs/images/2025/public-report/Public%20Report_EN_2025_DIGITAL.pdf